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SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE, and SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Appeal No. 16833 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITIOH FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter "appellants"), by and 
through their counsel, hereby petition the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah pursuant to Rule 76(e)(lJ of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for a rehearing in the above-captioned appeal 
based upon the following grounds: 
.. 
1. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Points IB and II set 
forth in appellants' original brief in light of recent legislation 
enacted by the Utah State Legislature and signed into law by the 
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Governor of the State of Utah subsequent to the handing down 
of said op inion. 
2. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point IB set forth in 
appellants' original brief because of apparent error in the 
Court's conclusion that "it is not the function of this Court 
to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of legislative 
enactments," where, as in the instant appeal, the ordinance in 
question was enacted under the guise of being "necessary and 
proper." 
3. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point II set forth in 
appellants' original brief due to the apparent conflict and 
inconsistencies between said opinion and the Court's previous 
opinions. 
4. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point III set forth 
in appellants' original brief due to the Court's apparent failure 
to address appellants' contention that respondents violated 
§ 34-35-6(l)(e) of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
5. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should i 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point III set forth 
in appellants' original brief because of apparent error in 
the Court's conclusion that the ordinance in question does not 
"require a massage parlor to refuse service to a customer 
ii 
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based on his or her gender." 
6. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in 
appellants' original brief because of apparent error in the 
Court's failure to apply the "strict scrutiny-compelling state 
interest" test to gender-based classifications as required by 
Article IV, Section I of the Utah State Constitution. 
7. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in 
appellants' original brief due to the apparent conflict and 
inconsistencies between the application of the "rational basis" 
test in said opinion and the applications in the Court 1 s previous 
opinions. 
8. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion as to appellants' Point V set forth in 
appellants' original brief due to the apparent conflict and 
inconsistencies between the interpretation of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause of the Utah State Constitution in said opinion and the 
interpretations in the Court's previous opinions. 
9. Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should 
reconsider its opinion in its entirety due to the apparent conflict 
and inconsistencies between the composition of the Court as said 
opinion was rendered and the mandate of Article VIII, Section 2 
of the Utah State Constitution. 
WHEREFORE, appellants petition that a rehearing in the above-
captioned appeal be granted on the matters set forth above as 
iii 
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supported by the brief, next herein, and that the lower court's 
Memorandum Decision be reversed, appellants' motion for summary 
judgment granted, the massage ordinance in question declared 
invalid and unconstitutional, and the enforcement of said 
ordinance permanently enjoined. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1981. 
ROBERT L. STOLEBARGER 
HALEY, DAHL & STOLEBARGER, P.C. 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT D. MAACK 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
lar1t The facts set forth herein supplement those previously 
ic set forth in appellants' original brief. 
On or about the 30th day of January, 1981, the Utah State 
lli~ Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 26, amending Title 58 of Utah 
Code Annotated (19S3), and, on or about the 18th day of February, 
~ ,(, . 
0~ 1981, this legislation, known as the Massage Practice Act, was 
signed into law by the Governor of the State of Utah. To assist 
the Court in appreciating the significance of this comprehensive 
11 legislation as it relates to the instant appeal, a copy of the 
newly enacted Massage Practice Act is attached as an appendix 
to this brief. 
As the Court will find from examining the recent legis-
lation, it is an exhaustive regulatory mechanism for masseuses 
and massage establishments. The new legislation was undoubtedly 
that contemplated at the public meeting held prior to the enact-
ment of the Salt Lake County massage ordinance under attack in 
the instant appeal. At that meeting, it was represented to 
those in attendance that the massage ordinance was a "difficult" 
short term solution, but that comprehensive state legislation 
was expected that would treat those in the massage profession 
fairly. 
In this regard, Hr. Curtis Oberhansley of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office stated: 
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... even though it is a difficult situation, 
those people that are sincere in acting as 
legitimate masseuses will have a way in which 
to do this. The words granddaddy clause, etc., 
have been mentioned, and there are provisions 
in the proposed legislation that is going up 
to the State for granddaddy clauses. There is 
a school that has now been set up in the State 
of Utah for muscle therapists, so we are not 
attempting to put anybody out of business who 
is a lawful masseuse. We are not attempting 
to put anybody out of business who is not 
acting as a front for prostitution. It is our 
intent to help these individuals consistent with 
the ordinance to become licensed under the State. 
As Sou are aware, the County does not have the 
ena ling legislation or the power to create a 
profession. It will have to go through the . 
State, and will have to be regulated by the 
De artment of Business Re ulation, but this will 
e done an it nee s to be done in or er to 
control the situation. That will then become a 
self- olicin or anization. (see, Stipulated 
Facts. (Emphasis a de . ) 
It is interesting to note that the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office "sold" the massage ordinance to the Salt 
Lake County Commission and those in attendance at the public 
meeting by promising that the State would take over the 
regulation of ~asseuses and massage establishments, and, some 
two years later, the State has fulfilled the promise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RECENT LEGISLATION ENACTED BY THE UTAH 
STATE LEGISLATURE AND SIGNED INTO LAW 
BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RENDERS THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION 
AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER 
AND PREEMPTED BY GENEHAL STATE LAW 
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A. CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION 
ENACTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
HANDING DOWN OF THE COURT'S 
OPINION COMES WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF REVIEW ON REHEARING. 
The rule as to what the Supreme Court will consider upon 
rehearing was established in the case of In Re MacKnight, 9 P. 
299 (Utah 1886), wherein this Court held: 
We must be convinced, either that 
the court failed to consider some 
material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions, 
or that some matter has been 
discovered which was unknown 
when the case was argued. 
(at pp. 299-300.) (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, the newly enacted legislation comes within "some 
matter ... discovered which was unknown when the case was argued." 
It is important to note that by referring this Court to the 
recent legislation appellants are not asserting a new contention 
(as in Swanson v. Sims, 170 P. 774 (Utah 1918)) nor arguing a 
question not assigned as error or previously argued (as in State 
v. Kahua, 390 P.2d 737 (Hawaii 1964)). 
In the instant appeal, appellants made the contention that 
the massage ordinance in question was an unnecessary and improper 
exercise of the police power (~, Point IB of Appellants' Brief) 
and that said ordinance was preempted by general state laws 
(~, Point II of Appellants' Brief). In referring this Court 
to the recent legislation, appellants are merely supporting their 
previous contentions. 
B. THE NEWLY ENACTED LEGISLATION 
RENDERS THE MASSAGE ORDINANCE 
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AN UNNECESSARY AND IMPROPER 
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER. 
In this Court's opinion in the instant appeal, reference 
was made to the case of Jensen v. Salt Lake County Board of 
Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974). This Court cited the 
language of the Jensen opinion, with approval, as follows: 
The regulation of physical therapists 
is under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Business Regulations of 
the State of Utah pursuant to the 
provisions of [ U .C,.A., 1953 ] Section 
58-1-5(12) and would not be subject 
to regulation by the County. (Redwood 
Gym, et al., v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, et al., No. 16833, at 
p. 6.) (Emphasis added.) 
This Court went on to state, interpreti:--,6 die rationale in the 
Jensen opinion, that: 
As the proposed ordinance attempted 
to regulate in an area expressly 
conunitted by state law to another 
agency, it was adjudged an improper 
exercise of the police power. 
(at p. 6.) (Emphasis added.) 
By virtue of the newly enacted Massage Practice Act, the 
instant appeal is now governed by the above-quoted Jensen 
rationale. The Massage Practice Act is found within Title 58 
of Utah Code Annotated, the same as the Physical Therapists Act 
in Jensen, and expressly commits regulation of masseuses and 
massage establishments to the Utah State Department of Business 
Regulation, just as in the Jensen case. 
Given the· recent legislation, Salt Lake County (hereinafter 
"the County") is without jurisdiction to invoke the police power: 
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to prohibit activity expressly committed for regulation to a 
state agency. This Court's language in its opinion in the 
instant appeal, although now outdated, is illustrative of the 
County's jurisdictional limitations: 
The power to permit or prohibit 
massages by members of the opposite 
sex has not been expressly commited 
by statute to any existing agency of 
government. As such, the provision 
does not constitute a jurisdiction 
infringement and is not improper on 
that basis. (at p. 7.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
In sum, as argued in appellants' Point IB and now that the 
area of massage regulation has been expressly committed by statute 
to the Utah State Department of Business Regulation, the County's 
attempt to regulate by ordinance in the same field is unquestion-
ably an invalid exercise of the police power. 
C. THE RECENTLY ENACTED 
LEGISLATION PREEMPTS 
THE ENTIRE FIELD OF 
MASSAGE REGULATION. 
This Court's opinion in the instant appeal rejected 
appellants' contention that .the massage ordinance was preempted 
by general state law because the Court found no conflict between 
the two. In this regard, the Court stated: 
... such conflict is not 
created by the fact that an 
ordinance denounces as unlawful 
an act upon which state law is 
silent. (at p. 7.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
With the recent enactment of comprehensive legislation 
regulating massueses and massage est.ablishments, it can no longer 
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be said that "state law is silent." The state has now spoken 
and two conflicts are presented, the first a conflict in language 
and the second a conflict in jurisdiction. 
Many activities are prohibited by the new legislation 
(see, Sections 16 and 19 of the Massage Practice Act), but opposi 
sex massage is allowed. Since the massage ordinance under attack 
prohibits opposite-sex massage, therein lies the conflicting 
language between said ordinance and the new comprehensive legis-
lation. With respect to conflicting language, this Court set 
forth the test in the case of Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 
671 (Utah 1939), wherein the Court stated: 
In determining whether an ordinance 
is in "conflict" with general state 
laws, the test is whether the ordin-
ance permits or licenses that which 
the state forbids and prohibits, and 
vice versa. Judged by such a test, 
an ordinance is in conflict if it 
forbids that which the state ~ermits. 
(at p. 673.) (Emphasis added. 
I 
Thus, applying the Kusse test to the instant appeal, it isj 
clear that the massage ordinance is invalid as forbiding opposite· 
sex massage, which the state permits. 
An even more compelling reason for invalidating the massage 
ordinance is the jurisdictional conflict between the County's 
licensing body and the State's regulatory agency. This Court 
addressed a similar set of circumstances in the case of State v. 
Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 671 (Ut~h 1968), wherein the Court 
examined Salt Lake City's attempt to license private clubs when 
the State of Utah had a regulatory statute in effect. There 
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the Court stated: 
... the invalidity arises, not 
from the conflict of language, 
but from the inevitable conflict 
o·f jurisdiction which would 
result from the dual.re~ulations 
covering the same ~roun . Only 
by such a broad de inition of 
"conflict" is it possible to 
confine local legislation to its 
proper field of supplementary 
regulation. (at p. 694.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
And, reference is again made to the language of the Jensen 
opinion, wherein this Court stated: 
The regulation of physical 
therapists is under the 
jurisdiction of the Department 
of Business Regulation of the 
State of Utah pursuant to the 
provisions of [U.C.A., 1953J 
Section 58-1-5(12) and would 
not be subject to regulation 
by the county. (at p. 4.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
In conclusion, as argued in appellants' Point II and now 
that the Utah State Legislature has spoken in enacting compre-
hensive legislation in the field of massage regulation, thereby 
affirmatively preempting that field, the massage ordinance in 
question is rendered invalid as prohibiting what the State's 
regulatory scheme permits and as infringing upon the jurisdiction 
of the State's regulatory agency. 
POINT II 
THERE IS APPARENT ERROR IN THE COURT'S 
CONCLUSION THAT "IT IS NOT THE FUNCTION 
OF THIS COURT TO EVALUATE THE WISDOH OR 
PRACTICAL NECESSITY OF LEGISLATIVE EN-
ACTMENTS," WHERE, AS IN THE INSTANT 
-7-
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APPEAL, THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION 
WAS ENACTED UNDER THE-GUISE OF 
BEING "I'iECESSARY AND PROPER." 
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the Court 
stated that: 
It is not the function of this 
Court to evaluate the wisdom or 
practical necessity of legislative 
enactments. (at p. 5.) 
Appellants respectfully submit that the above-quoted 
statement of the Court is in error where, as in the instant appea 
the Court is requested to rule on an ordinance enacted under the 
guise of being "necessary and proper." I 
Appellants concede that ordinarily courts will not determi1 
the "propriety, wisdom, necessity or expedience" of legislative 
enactments. (See, Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching 
Co., 414 P. 2d 963, rehearing 421 P. 2d 504 (Utah 1966)). But, in 
the Listant appeal, the massage ordinance in question was attacke, 
as be int; unnecessary and improper and, thus, an invalid exercise j 
of the police power. 
This Court has stated that the powers of a county are limiO 
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Kusse, this Court foUJ.1d that a 
municipality: 
may possess and exercise only 
the powers granted in express words 
and such as are necessarily or 
fairly implied in or incident to, 
the powers expressly granted, or 
those essential to the declareO-
objects and purposes ... not merely 
convenient but indispensable. 
(at p. 672.) (Emphasis added.) 
(see also, Dillon Municip~l Corpor-
ations, 5th Ed., p. 448, s237.) 
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In the instant appeal, the County has argued that the 
massage ordinance in question is "necessary and proper" to 
improve the morals of its citizenry. Appellants concede that 
improving morals comes within the "declared objects and purposes" 
found at ~17-5-77 of Utah Code Annotated (1953). However, 
appellants insist that, under the holding in Kusse, the County's 
ordinance must undergo the Court's scrutiny. In this regard, 
the Court must look to see if the ordinance is "essential" to 
improving morals "not merely convenient but indispensable." 
Appellants respectfully submit that this Court cannot deter-
mine whether the questioned ordinance is essential and indispen-
sable without looking to its wisdom and practical necessity. 
In sum, appellants ask this Court to reconsider its opinion 
as to appellants Point IB set forth in appellants' original brief 
and determine whether the massage ordinance is essential and 
indispensable to improving the morals of the citizens of Salt 
Lake County. 
POINT III 
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND 
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COURT'S 
OPINION AS TO APPELLANTS' PREEMPTION 
ARGUMENT IN THE INSTANT APPEAL AND 
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS OPINIONS. 
In rejecting appellants' preemption argument (~, Point II 
of Appellants' Brief), this Court ruled that "the opposite-sex 
massage provision is not invalid by reason of preemption by state 
18" law. ~ Footnote 18 then went on to say: 
We so hold in awareness of the 
decision of Layton City v. Speth, 
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Utah, 578 P.2d 828 (1978). (Emphasis 
added.) 
Prior to the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the 
case of Layton City v. Speth was the last word on preemption 
from the Utah Supreme Court. In the Layton City case, this 
Court held invalid a city's attempt to regulate the use of illeg< 
drugs by copying in its ordinance the language of the State 
Controlled Substances Act. The court ruled that given state 
occupation of the subject matter, the municipality, under its 
general police power, did not even have the authority to copy 
the statute. In this regard, the Court stated: 
The State of Utah has 
controlling the sale, 
controlled substances 
enacted statutes 
gift, or use of 
has no power or authority 
statute in its ordinance. 
(t)he city 
to copy the 
(at p. 829.) 
i 
In applying the approach taken in Layton City to the massa~ 
ordinance in the instant appeal, appellants argued that said ! 
ordinance was preempted by the comprehensive general state laws ! 
regulating criminal sexual activity, and that if the County was 
without authority to even copy the state prostitution laws, it ! 
was surely without authority to enact an ordinance that amended 
the state's laws to include an additional classification of sexu~ 
offense. 
The Court in rendering its opinion in the instant appeal 
does not discuss, distinguish or overrule the case of Layton C_ill 
and yet it appears to adopt the rationale articulated in former 
Chief Justice Crockett's dissent in Layton City. If the Court 
wishes to adopt the dissenting opinion in Layton City as its 0~ 1 
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it would seem that the Court would necessarily have to overrule, 
or at least distinguish, that case from the instant appeal. 
In conclusion, until Layton City is overruled or distin-
guished, appellants respectfully submit that, under the doctrine 
of stare decisis, this Court must determine the preemption issue 
presented in the instant appeal under and in accordance with its 
previous decision. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS 
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT RESPON-
DENTS HAVE VIOLATED ~34-35-6(l)(e) 
OF THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT. 
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, appellants' 
contention that the questioned ordinance is violative of the 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act (~, Point III of Appellants' Brief) 
is disposed of on grounds that appellants failed to establish 
that they come within the Act's definition of "employer." 
The Court, however, has failed to address appellants' 
additional contention that the County Commission had, by virtue of 
s enacting the massage ordinance, violated s34-35-6(l)(e), which 
states in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice: 
(e) for any person ... to compel or 
otherwise coerce the doing of an act 
defined in this section to be a dis-
criminatory or unfair employment 
practice or to obstruct or prevent 
any person from complying with the 
provisions of this chapter .... 
(Emphasis added.) . 
The Act defines "person" at ~34-35-2(2), as follows: 
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(2) The word "person" means one or 
more individuals, partnerships, 
associations, corporations, legal 
representatives, trustees, receivers, 
the State of Utah and all political 
subdivisions and agencies thereof. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In sum, appellants respectfully request that this Court 
reconsider appellants' Point III set forth in appellants' origino 
brief insofar as the Court's opinion did not dispose of the issue 
presented therein. 
POINT V 
THERE IS AN APPARENT ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE MASSAGE 
ORDINANCE DOES NOT "REQUIRE A 
MASSAGE PARLOR TO REFUSE SERVICE 
TO A CUSTOMER BASED ON HIS OR HER 
GENDER. II 
i 
The Court's opinion in the instant appeal disposed of I 
appellants' contention that the questioned ordinance is violativ1 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act (~, Point III of Appellants 1 Brief: 
by concluding that the massage ordinance does not "require a 
massage parlor to refuse service to a customer based on his or 
her gender." (at p. 10.) 
Appellants respectfully submit that the Court is in error 
in reaching the above-quoted conclusion and that same is totally! 
inconsistent with the following language of the opinion: 
All individuals, male or female, are 
entitled to services of a licensed 
masseur, provided that the masseur 
is not a member of the opposite sex. 
(at p. 10.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court is stating on the one hand that the massage ordin 
ance does not require the refusal of service to a customer basea 
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on his or her sex, and then stating on the other hand that it 
does require a masseuse to refuse a customer of the opposite sex. 
The only case cited by either appellants or respondents 
that is on point is Cianciolo v. City Council of Knoxville, 
376 F. Supp. 719 (D.C. Tenn. 1974). There, the court 
examined a massage ordinance similar to that in the instant 
appeal under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Act 
served as the model for Utah's civil rights statutes. The 
court found that sex was not a bona fide occupational 
qualification and further concluded that: 
The ordinance . . . fails to recognize 
that not all masseuses will abuse a 
historically legitimate occupation 
when permitted to massage clients of 
the opposite sex . . . . The infirmity 
is that this presumption is grounded 
on an individual's sex. In conclusion, 
it would appear that the ordinance does 
not comply with the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(at p. 723.) (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents attempt to discredit the precedential value 
of the Cianciolo case by suggesting that it has been overruled 
by a footnote in an Indiana case. The Cianciolo case, contrary 
to respondents' assertions, has not been overruled by any 
court. The Indiana Supreme Court, in City of Indianapolis v. 
Wright, 371 N.E.2d 1298, appeal dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 804, 99 S.Ct. 60, 53 
L.Ed.2d 97 (1978); merely stated in footnote 1 that Cianciolo 
was decided prior to the flood of federal cases finding massage 
ordinances constitutional, and, as such, that Cianciolo had 
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"apparently" been overruled. Appellants wish to point out that 
the City of Indianapolis case did not present the issue of a 
Civil Rights Act violation, and, thus, its footnote can in no 
way be considered as reflecting on that aspect of the Cianciolo 
case. Furthermore, counsel for appellants have not found a sing] 
case that has reached either the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
or the United States Supreme Court that has addressed the issue 
presented in Cianciolo, and these two courts are the only courts 
with the authority to overrule Cianciola. Thus, the holding 
reached by the court in Cianciolo is still the law with respect 
to massage ordinances in violation of the Civil Rights Act and 
still of precedential value to this Court in deciding the same 
issue. 
In sum, appellants respectfully submit that the Court is in: 
error when it concludes that the sex of the customer is not a 
determining factor in the rendering of services by a masseuse 
I 
and that said conclusion is inconsistent with the Cianciolo case I 
and with the Court's own language indicating that the rendering, 
services by a masseuse is indeed dependent on the sex of his or 
her customers. Appellants respectfully request that the Court 
reconsider Point III of appellants' original brief in light of 
the foregoing inconsistencies. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY 
THE STRICT SCRUTINY-COMPELLING STATE 
INTEREST TEST. 
In the Court's opinion in the instant appeal, the Court 
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elected not to apply the "strict scrutiny-compelling state" interest 
test (see, Point V of Appellants' Brief) by finding that the 
massage ordinance in question did not create a gender-based 
classification. The Court specifically withheld a ruling as to 
whether a gender-based classification is inherently suspect under 
Utah law and, thus, whether the strict scrutiny-compelling state 
interest test should be applied. 
As stated more fully above at Point V herein, appellants 
respectfully submit that the Court is in error when it concludes 
that the massage ordinance does not create a gender-based class-
ification. 
For the reasons set forth in Point V above, in addition to 
those at Point V of appellants' brief, appellants respectfully 
submit that the Court should decide if a gender-based classifica-
tion is inherently suspect under Utah law and, having so decided, 
that the Court should apply the strict scrutiny-compelling state 
interest test to the gender-based classification in the instant 
appeal. 
POINT VII 
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND 
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION 
OF THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST IN THE 
COURT'S OPINION IN THE INSTANT 
APPEAL AND THE APPLICATIONS IN THE 
COURT'S PREVIOUS OPINIONS. 
In its opinion in the instant appeal, the Court applied the 
"rational basis" test to appellants' contentions that the massage 
ordinance is unconstitutional (~, Point V of Appellants' Brief). 
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Appellants respectfully submit that the application of the 
rational basis test in the instant appeal is in conflict with 
the applications of said test in the Court's previous opinions. 
In the Jensen case, for example, this Court stated: 
At the trial in the court below a 
county commissioner and a member 
of the county sheriff's office 
testified that prostitution was the 
major concern in the adoption of the 
ordinance in question. It is the 
county's contention that it is a 
valid exercise of police power to 
regulate massage establishments and 
to control prostitution. We are 
of the opinion that the county does 
have the power to deal with those 
matters directly. However, the 
ordinance under consideration does 
neither, but rather it attempts to 
set standards and qualifications of 
those· persons who intend to engage 
in a legitimate occupation or trade. 
(at p. 4.) (Emphasis added.) 
The Court in Jensen, as the above-quoted language indicates, 
concluded that the County's massage parlor licensing ordinance 
was an attempt to indirectly control prostitution and, thus, said; 
ordinance was not rationally related to the stated purpose, and 
further concluded that if the County wanted to control prostitu· 
tion it had the power to do so, but that it must exercise that 
power "directly." 
Appellants respectfully submit that the Court should apply 
the rational basis test in the instant appeal in the manner in 
which it was applied in Jensen. That is to say, that this Co~t 
should examine the massage ordinance in question to see if it 
attempts to do indirectly what could be done directly, and, 
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therefore, whether it is rationally related to its objective. 
An additional example of the conflict and inconsistencies 
between the application of the rational basis test in the instant 
appeal and the applications of said test in prior decisions can 
be found in Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1978). In Hart Health Studio, this Court was presented with 
a massage ordinance somewhat similar to that in the instant appeal 
which required the posting of a performance bond before a mass-
euse could be permitted to massage a customer of the opposite sex. 
There, the Court was informed that the purpose for such a perform-
ance bond was to discourage "pleasure-type" massages. The Court, 
applying the rational basis test, found no reasonable basis for 
such a performance bond. 
Appellants respectfully submit that if it was unreasonabie 
to require a masseuse to post a performance bond before he could 
render services to a customer of the opposite sex, it is, under 
the same rationale, unreasonable to prohibit a masseur from 
massaging members of the opposite sex entirely. If, as this 
Court determined in Hart Health Studio, requiring a performance 
bond had no rational relationship to discouraging "pleasure-type" 
massages, then surely the massage ordinance in question, which 
blanketly prohibits opposite-sex massage, has no rational rela-
tionship to the objective of curbing prostitution. 
In sum, appellants respectfully submit that the rational 
basis test be applied to the instant appeal in a manner consistent 
with its application in this Court's previous opinions. 
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POINT VIII 
THERE ARE APPARENT CONFLICTS AND 
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF 
ATTAINDER CLAUSE OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE INSTANT APPEAL 
AND THE COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS IN 
PREVIOUS OPINIONS. 
In this Court's opinion in the instant appeal, appellants' 
contention that the massage ordinance in question is a bill of 
attainder under Article I, Section 18 of the Utah State Constitu· 
tion (see, Point V of Appellants' Brief) is disposed of summarily 
Appellants respectfully submit that in summarily disposing 
l 
with the bill of attainder issue presented, the Court created 
several inconsistencies between its interpretation of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause in the instant appeal and its interpretation 
in Hart Health Studio. 
The Court, in the instant appeal, found the massage ordin-
ance in question to bear none of the characteristics of a bill of 
attainder. In this regard, the Court stated: 
A bill of attainder is one which 
imposes guilt, and inflicts pun-
ishment, upon an identifiable 
individual or group without jud-
icial process. (citations omitted.) 
The enactment here under consider-
ation bears none of these char-
acteristics. (at p. 12.) 
In Hart Heal th Studio, the Court was presented with an earl! 
version of the County massage ordinance, which provided in part 
for an annual license fee of $5,000.00 for any massage parlor 
employing a masseur whose massage parlor license had been revoked 
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within the past 12 months. This Court, in examining the consti-
tutionality of this provision, stated: 
We also believe this section of the 
ordinance is somewhat like the old 
bills of pains and penalties (see, 
Article I, Section 18, Utah Consti-
tution). The ordinance clearly 
penalizes the masseur and his 
employer without a trial or convic-
tion, and thus is clearly invalid 
and unenforceable under the con-
stitutional provisions cited. 
(at p. 118.) (Emphasis added.) 
The instant appeal presents a type of penalty to masseuses 
without trial or conviction similar to that in Hart Health Studio. 
Only in the instant appeal, the punishment is not an excessive 
license fee it is being driven out of business. 
The sanction of forfeiture of a job or business enterprise 
has long been deemed to be punishment within the contemplation of 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. (See, Nixon v. Administration of 
General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), at p. 469; see also, 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437). 
That a group need not be small to be encompassed within 
the Bill of Attainder Clause is well accepted. (See, United 
States v. Brown; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board, 367 U.S. 1). 
Appellants submit that the attainder presented in Hart Health 
Studio was the County's deciding for itself that a group of 
masseuses who had worked for a massage establishment who's license. 
had been revoked should be punished by requiring license fees so 
high that no one would hire them. In the instant appeal, the 
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size of the group and the degree of punishment have been increas 
so that, under the new ordinance, the County has decided for 
itself that all masseuses should be punished by limiting their 
clientele to the same sex, in effect, driving them out of busine1 
Under the approach taken in Hart Health Studio, both ordinances 
inflict punishment to ascertainable groups without trial or 
conviction, and both constitute violations of the Bill of Atta~-
der Clause. 
In conclusion, appellants respectfully submit that this 
Court should interpret the Bill of Attainder Clause in the instan 
l 
appeal in a manner consistent with its interpretation in Hart 
Health Studio. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS 
OPINION IN ITS ENTIRETY DUE TO 
THE APPARENT CONFLICT AND INCON-
SISTENCIES BETWEEN THE COMPOS-
ITION OF THE COURT AS SAID 
OPINION WAS RENDERED AND THE 
.MANDATE OF ARTICLE VIII, 
SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION. 
The opinion handed down by the Court in the instant appeal 
indicated that it was authored by Justice Hall and concurred in 
by Justice Stewart and District Judge Conder, and further indi-
cated that then-Chief Justice Crockett, Justice Wilkins and 
now-Chief Justice Maughan did not participate. 
Appellants submit that the above composition of the Supreme 
Court is improper as being in conflict with the mandate of 
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution. In thls 
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regard, Article VIII, Section 2 states in relevant part, as 
follows: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of 
five jud~es, which number may be 
increase or decreased by the 
legislature, but no alteration or 
increase shall have the effect of 
removing a judge from office .... 
If a justice of the Supreme Court 
shall be disqualified from sitting 
in a cause before said court, the 
remaining judges shall call a ~­
district judge to sit with them 
on the hearing of such a cause .... 
(Emphasis added.) 
As pointed out in Shippers Best Exp., Inc. v. Newsom, 579 
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1978), by then-Justice Maughan in his well 
supported dissent: 
In interpreting the Constitution 
of Utah, reference must always 
be made to the fundamental guide 
set forth in Article I, Section 
26: "The provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be 
otherwise." (at p. 1319.) 
(Emphasis is Justice Maughan's.) 
In the instant appeal, the Supreme Court, contrary to 
Article VIII, Section 2, was composed of only three judges, not --
the required five. Appellants realize that Justice Wilkins and 
then-Chief Justice Crockett resigned from the Court and that 
now-Chief Justice Maughan was ill during the pendency of this 
appeal. Nevertheless, appellants respectfully submit that the 
remaining judges were mandated to call up three district judges 
to sit with them in the place of their disqualified brethren. 
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With respect to what constitutes disqualification within 
the meaning of Article VIII, Section 2, this Court is referred 
to its earlier decision in In Re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103 
(Utah __ ). There this Court ruled that the term "disqualified' 
is to be used in its rational and ordinary sense to include 
illness, physical disability or any other condition of incapacit1 
Thus, resignation and illness clearly come within the meaning of 
disqualified as it was used in Article VIII, Section 2. 
As then-Justice Maughan further pointed out in his dissent 
in Shippers : 
... the procedure to substitute 
for a disqualified justice in 
Sec. 2, Art. VIII is exclusive; 
for all instances in which a 
justice aoes not sit on a par-
ticular case. (at p. 1320.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, appellants respectfully 
submit that this Court should reconsider its opinion in the 
instant appeal with five judges participating, as contemplated 
in and mandated by Article VIII, Section 2 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request that a rehearing in 
the above-captioned appeal be granted on the matters set 
forth in Points I through IX hereinabove and that the lower 
court's Memorandum Decision be reversed, appellants' motion 
for summary judgment granted, the massage ordinance 
declared invalid and unconstitutional, and the enforcement 
of said ordinance permanently enjoined. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 1981. 
ROBERT L. STOLEBARGER 
HALEY, DAHL & STOLEBARGER, P.C. 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ROBERT D. MAACK 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Date ____ l_~LQ~----
( MASSAGE ?RACTICE ACT) 
1981 
GENERAL SESSION 
7 S. B. No. 26 By Ronald T. Halverson 
AANOW~ 8 
9 
10 AN ACT RELATING TO MASSAGE PRACTICE; PROVIDING FOR A BOARD OF 
11 MASSAGE; PROVIDING FOR LICENSURE AND THE SETTING, 
12 IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF STMTDARDS FOR MASSAGE 
13 TECHNICIANS AND MASSAGE ESTABLISHMENTS; AND PROVIDING AN 
14 EFFECTIVE DATE. 
15 THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 58-1-5, UT.?..H CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
16 LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER S, LAWS OF UTAH 1980, AND ENACTS 
17 NEW SECTIONS. 
18 Be it enacted bv the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Massage Practice Act." 
Section 2. As used in this act: 
(1) "Massage" means the cractice of a orofession whereby 
the ooerator scientifically acolies his hands to the patron, 
using variations of the following procedures: ef!leurage 
(stroking), friction (rubbing), oetrissage (kneading), 
26 tacotement (percussion), and vibration (shaking or trembling). 
27 (2) "Massage technician" means a oet"son who has comoleted 
28 those courses of study in ~he crinciples of anatomy and 
29 physiology as are generally included in the regular course of 
30 s~udv provided by a recognized and acproved school of massaae 
31 and who oractices or administers any of the technioues of body 
32 massaqe, either by hands or with a mechanical or electrical 
33 aoparatus, for the ouroose of body massaging, reducina or 
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1 S. B. No. 26 
2 contouring, which may include the use of oil rubs, heat lames, 
3 salt glows, hot and cold oacks, tub, shower, steam or cabinet 
4 baths. 
5 (3) "Massage establishment" means any establishment or 
6 el ace of business in which one or more of the methods of 
7 treatment identified ·in subsections Pl and {2) of this 
8 section 1 are administered or used. 
9 {4) "Board" means the Utah board of massage created in 
10 this chapter. 
11 Section 3. There is created, subject to the reauirements 
12 of chapter l of title 58, 
13 consist of five members, 
a board of massage which shall 
all of whom shall be apoointed for 
14 terms of four years and until their resoective successors have 
15 been aopointed and aualified, except the members of the first 
16 board, two of whom shall be aooointed to serve until July l, 
17 1983, and three of whom shall be apoointed to serve until July 
18 1, 1985. 
19 Section 4. The members of the board shall, as soon as 
20 aooointed, and annually thereafter in the month of June, elect 
21 from their number a chairman. 
Section 5. rt shall be unlawful for anv oerson to engage 
23 in the practice of, or attemot to practice massagei to act as a 
24 massage technician for a fee, for a gratuity, or in a free 
25 demonstration; or to conduct or teach massage without a license 
26 issued under the orovisions of this chacter. Any oerson 
27 emoloved by an educational institution or business that is 
28 orimarily engaged in providing physical conditioning and 
29 !itness courses to the oublic, bv a orivate secondary school, 
30 or by an educationa!_institution regulated_~Y the state board 
31 £._~ education, s~ate decartment o~f~~e~d~u~c:::..=.a~t~1~o~n~,'--__;.o~r~~a~__;.r~e~g~i-o_n_a~l 
32 accrediting body shall be exempt from t~e o~ovisions of this 
33 chaoter. 
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AMENDED ON THIRD READING 
1 S. B. No. 26 
2 Section 6. Nothing herein shall be construed as 
3 authorizing any person licensed as a -~~~e technician to 
4 engage in any manner in the practice of mcdi~ine as defined in 
5 the laws of this state: 
' 6 Section 7. Doctors of medicine; R.·N.· 1 a,· L.P.N. 's. 'physical 
7 
8 
9 
10 
therapists, osteopaths and ·chlropracto·rs· 'licensed· ·i'n this ·state, f-OSPlTAL 
STAFF r-EMBERS and school athletic trainers shall be exempt from the provisions of 
this chapter. 
Section 8. Any person who furnishes to the department 
11 satisfactory oroof that he or she is 18 years of age or olderL 
12 [a--hlsA---s•Ao<>lr--9-!aa.iu&tre---o-!'--~i"cl"&l:-el'\-t-,J and of good moral 
13 character and temperate habits, and makes oath that he or she 
14 has not been convicted of any offense that would constitute a 
15 !~lony, either in this state or any other state or country 
17 .f.!:~99ntials issu~.E-~- schoo~ of..~..§.~-~ aooroved by the 
18 · J\merican Massa~ and Thera.p~seociat~2l!.-9.r its _successor or 
19 Jjk~~i tute..t-F~resenting study ao de t.ar•mined bl( the boa rod 
20 [ ~.~E~~~· le.:_s_:!han*) ~:r UI) to 1. 000 h(')llr!=l ;inn IJhf"I r;\i:;qpq ;:i . 
21 reasonable demonstrative, oral and written examination, 
22 conducted by and under the supervision and direction 
23 of the board, in the art of body massaqe by hand, or 
24 w~th any mechanical or electrical aoparatus (excluding fever 
25 therapy) for the ourpose of body massa9_i_ry_q_, reducing or 
26 contouring, and in the use of oil rubs, salt glow, hot and cold 
27 packs, tub, steam, shower, heat lamps ond. similar bath, and 
28 E_ays the fees speci:fied in this chaoter, which fees shall 
29' accompany the application to the dcoartment, shall be entitled 
30 to be licensed and to be issued a li_c~~ as a massage 
31 techn:.=i:...;;c:...;;i;.;;a;.;;n;;..;.;____,M..;;..i"'"n-.-.irn.um__E!!Sill-~ments for a_ license shall be '! 
32 : fl_enernl average i_n...i!,!,_e examination of 75% in each subject. 
33 ' Any person who has enqa9etj in t~actice of massage in 
34 the State of Utah for five years before July l, 1981, and meets 
35 nll age and moral_~uirernenta shal.l on.l:_y_pe re~red~..E.!~ 
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l- S, B. No. 26 
· 2· the examination specified in this section, in order to be 
3 licensed[**i * provided*the*person*takes*the*examination*before*July 
4 l, "1981. *After ~une * 30, * 1981, *all* persons* seeking* to* be 
. I 
5 license.d * shall *be * requir.ed * to * satisfy* the "tlducational "and 
6 examination '*recruirements ~n *addition* to* the* nge *and* moral 
7 reauirements. **] .:. 
e The fee to be paid by an aoplicant to determine his or her 
9 fitness to receive a license to practice as a licensed massa~e 
10 technician shall be not more than $75, as determined by the 
11 di rector. 
12 The board shall hold examinations, oral, written, ·and by 
13 way of demonstrations, at least annually and from time to time 
14 at such place or olacas as the board, under the direction of 
15 the director, may desicmate. 
16 Section 9. Any apolicant failing to pass the examination 
17 orovided for in section 8 shall be entitled, after six months, 
18 to a reexamination u:eon 12aY!!!ent Of an additional fee of $10. 
19 Should the a22licant fail to 12ass the examination the second 
20 time, the director may refuse a subse~ent aeolication until 
21 the expiration of one year. 
22 Section 10. Any person who has been duly licensed in 
23 another state to practice massage which state has and maintains 
24 a standard of practice which is substantially the same as that 
25 maintained in this state, and who has been lawfully and 
26 continuously enszaged in au ch 12ractice for two :tears or more 
27 immediatel:z: before filing his or her aE12lication to Eractice in 
28 this state and who submits to the board a duly attested 
29 certificate fr.om the examining board of the state in which he 
30 or she is licens~d, certify~9 the fact of his 2r her 
31 licensure and being a person of ..s22SL moral character and of 
32 professional attainments, may upon paying the required fee be 
33 granted a license to practice in this state without being 
34 required to take an examination; except that no license shall 
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1 S. B. No. 26 
2 be issued to ·any such aoolicant unless the state or territory 
3 which issued the oerson his or her license extends the same 
4 orivileae recicrocally to cersons holding licenses from this 
S state. The board shall have the power to enter into recicrocal 
6 agreements with other- states whose requirements are 
7 substantially the same as those herein orovided. 
8 Section 11. An apolicant may uocn paving a fee of not to 
9 exceed $50, as determined by the director, take the examination 
10 on anatomy, physiology and related subjects given by the board, 
11 and, on passing the examination shall be issued by the 
12 deoartment an apprenticeship registration certificate, 
13 permitting that person to work under a licensed massage 
14 technician for a oeriod of one vear only. After the one-year 
15 oeriod the aporentice may make reouest for examination as 
16 orovided in section 8. 
17 Section 12. If the deoartment or a majority of the board 
18 members has reason to believe that the ohysical or mental 
19 health of any applicant is such as to jeaoardize or endanger 
20 the health of those who seek relief from him or her, then the 
21 deoartment or the board shall require the aoolicant to have a 
22 ohvsical examination by a competent medical examiner selected 
23 by the board. The department shall cay the cost of the 
24 examination. If the medical examiner confirms that the 
25 aoolicant's oh·1s1cal or mental health is such as to jeooardize 
26 or endanger the health of those who seek relief from him or 
27 '_n_e_r~1~_t_h~e~_d_e~o_a~r_t_m_e_n_t~~m_a~y..___d_;,.e_n~y~-t~~-e~a~p~p__,_l_i_c_a_t_i_o_n~_f_o_r~a~_l_i_c_e_n_s~e 
28 until the applicant furnishes satisfactory croof of being 
29 2hysically and mentally dompetent to cractice ma~sage. 
30 ?_ec'::1on 13. Each licensed massaqe technician shall 
J : ~..£!) ~p i -: u o u s l '! d l ~ o 1 a y at the o l ace o f hi s o r he r p r act i c e o f 
the license issued him or he~. ~ithin 30 davs after 
33 issuance of the license. 
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2 Section 14. All licenses issued by the department shall 
3 expire on the first day of January of the year next succeeding 
4 the issuance thereof. A license may be renewed upon the 
5 payment of a fee to be fixed annually by the department. 
6 Section 15. Attendance at such postgraduate course as 
7 may be prescribed by the board, at least two days each year, is 
8 a further requirement for renewal of the license. The board 
9 may waive the continuing education reouirement in case of 
10 certified illness or undue hardship. 
11 Section 16. It shall be unlawful for any person to 
12 operate or conduct any massage establishment which is not 
13 licensed, or does not conform to the sanitary regulations which 
14 may be adopted by the department, or to employ any person as an 
15 operator or massage technician who does not hold a license 
16 issued under the provisions of this chapter. 
17 It shall be unlawful for any massage establishment to 
18 disolay signs indicating massage or to advertise massage unless 
19 all of the massage technicians in the establishment are 
20 licensed under this chapter. All license holders shall be 
21 designated massage technicians and shall not use any title or 
22 abbreviation thereof without the designation "massage 
23 technician." 
24 Section 17. Any persQJl desiring to operate a'massage 
25 establishment whera· massage is practiced shall make application 
26 to the department for a massage establishment license. All 
27 licenses shall expire on January 1 o! each year and shall be 
28 renewed annually. The fee for the massage establishment 
29 license shall be fixed annually by the department and shall not 
30 exceed the eum of $10 and shall be paid to the department. 
31 Section 18. It shall be the duty of the tooal board of heaith 
32 at least annually and from time to time to examine and inspect or cause 
33 to be examined and inspected all massage establishments in the 
34 state_:_ The toaai ~ of heaith and it1s aqents and employees rney 
35 !!nter and 
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l S. B. No. 26 
2 insnect any mnnsaqe establishment at any time when the 
3 establis~ment is open for the transaction of business. The Zooa? 
4 board of hea1th shaZZ revort in[raations to the ZoaaZ Zaw enforcement 
5 ££'!.2~ THE EOARD MAY a-tARGg A REASONABLE FEE NOT TO EXCEED ACTUAL COST FOR THE 
Sa INSPECTION PROVIDED. · 
6 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Section_--'1_9_. ___ T_h_e __ l_i_cense of a rnassaqe technician or a 
massage establishment may be revoke~. ~usoended __ o_r~_c_a_n_c_e_l_e_d 
upon any one or more of the following grounds· 
deceit in the admission to the oractice of massage; 
i2) The licensee has been convicted during the past five 
Y.!?.ars of a felony. The conviction of a __ f_e_l_o_n_y~_s_h_a_l_l __ b_e_ 
13 
1 construed to be the conviction of any offense which if 
14
. committed within the State of Utah would constitute a felony 
15 under the laws thereof; 
16 l (3) The licensee is engaaed in the practice of massage 
17
' under a false or assumed name or is impersonating another 
18 practitioner of a like or different name; 
19' (4) The licensee is addicted to or osychologicallv 
20· dependent upon the use of intoxicating liquors, narcotics or 
21: i stimulants to such an extent as to incapacitate him or her from 
22 I 
1 ~he performance of his or her professional duties; 
23 ; ill The physical or mental condition of the licensee is 
21! 
, determined by a comoetent medical examiner to be such as to 
I 
25' 
26l 
i 
I 
27 
28 
jeopardize or endanger the health of those who seek relief from 
the registrant. The department or majority of the board may 
demand an examination of the licensee by a comoetent medical 
examiner selected by the board at the deoartment's expense. 
"9 I 
• i Failure to submit to such an examination s)iall const:.tute 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
immediate grounds for suspension of the licensee's licensei 
(6} The licensee is guilty of willful negligence in the 
practice of massage or has been guilty of employing, allowing 
or permitting any unlicensed person to perform massage in his 
or her establishment; 
-7-
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2 (7) Th.e licensee is g-u.ilty of untrue, fraudulent, 
3 misleading or decective advertising. or he or she crescribes 
4 medicines or drugs; or 
5 ( 8} The licensee has violated anv provision of this 
6 chaoter. 
7 Section 20. The,oroceedings for cancellation, revocation 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
or suspension of a license may be initiated when the deoartment 
or the board has in.formation that any person may have been 
guilty of any misconduct as provided in section 19 or is guilty 
of gross incompetence or unprofessional or dishonorable 
conduct. 
Section 21. Upon written aoolication establishing 
compliance with existing licensing requirements and for reasons 
the deoartment deems sufficient, the deoartment, for good cause 
shown, may, under such conditions as it mav impose, reinstate 
or reissue a license to any person whose license has been 
18 susoended or revoked and, uoon susoension of a license, the 
19 department in its order may provide for automatic reinstatement 
20 thereof after a fixed oeriod of time as provided in the order. 
21 Section 22. Any person violating the orovisions of this 
22 chacter mav be enjoined from further violations in the district 
23 court of comcetent jurisdiction, pursuant to Utah law, for 
24 cause shown, upon the initiative of the department. 
25 Sect:on 23. Section 58-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
26 last amended by Chapter 5, Laws of Utah 1990, 
27 read: 
is amended to 
28 58-1-5. The functions of the depar~ment of registration 
29 shall be exercised by the director of registration under the 
30 supervision of the commission of the department of business 
31 regulation and, when so provided, with the collaboration and 
32 assistance of representative committees of the several 
33 professions. trades and occupations as follows: 
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2 ( l) For accountants, a committee of three competent 
3 public accountants. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
(2) For architects, a committee of five architects, to be 
known as the "Architectural Examining Board." 
(3) For barbers, a committee of three persons, citizens 
of the United States who have practiced barbering for at least 
five years. 
(4) for podiatry, a committee of three podiatrists. 
(5) For chiropractors, a committee of three 
11 chiropractors; chiropractic is defined as the science of 
12 palpating and adjusting the articulation of the spinal column. 
13 ( 6) for dentists, a committee of five persons; but no 
14 member of such committee shall be a member of the faculty of 
15 any dental college or dental department of any medical college 
16 or have a financial interest in any such college. 
17 (7) for persons in the practice of funeral service, a 
18 committee of three persons licensed for the practice of funeral 
19 service or as funeral directors or embalmers or for a 
20 combination thereof, each of whom has had a minimum of five 
21 years' experience in the preparation and disposition of dead 
22 human bodies, and in the practice of embalming, i~mediately 
23 preceding their appointment. The committee shall be known as 
24 
25 
the "State Soard of funeral Service." 
(8) For cosmetologists and 
26 five licensed cosmetologists. 
electrologists, a board of 
27 (9) For persons who apply for, or have been granted, a 
28 license to practice medicine and surgery in all branches 
29 pursuant to the Utah Medical Practice Act, sections 58-12-26 
30 through 58-12-39, a committee of s~ven physicians licensed 
Jl pursuant to that act, to be lmown as the "Physicians Licensing 
J 2 !3 <) ..:.i i.- rJ . " I' Io t w l th s t n n rl i n g the rn o v 1 z l on s a f :.:, e c t i o n S 8 - 1 - l ..J: , the 
JJ concurrence of at least five ml;!mber:::. of the board shall be 
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2 required for the taking of any action under the Utah Medical 
3 Practice Act. 
4 (10) For practitioners in th~.treatment of human ailments 
S in accordan~e with the tenets of a professional schoolr 
6 colleg~, or institution, recognized by the department of 
7 registr~tion, of whicr the applicant is a graduate as 
8 designated in his applic~tion for a license, including the 
9 practice of obstetrics with the use of drugs or medicine, but. 
10 without operative surgery, e~cept operative minor surgery, a 
11 committee of five members to be designated by the director. 
12 Notwithstanding the provisions of section 58-1-6, one member 
13 shall be licens~d to practice medicine and surgery in all 
14 branches, two ~embers shall be practitioners of naturopathy 
15 licensed to pr~ctice the treatment of human ailments without 
16 the use of drugs or medicine and without operative surgery, one 
17 member shall be·a citizen who is not licensed in any healing 
18 art and one member shall be on the staff of the university of 
19 Utah medical school. 
20 ( 11) for practitioners of naturopathy, a committee of 
21 three members, each of whom shall be a graduate of a school of 
22 nat'....!ropathy .of standing recognized by the department of 
23 registration. 
( 12) For practitioners of physical therapy, a committee 
25 of three members, each of whom shall be a licensed pr~ctitioner 
26 of physical therapy in this state and a graduate of an ap~roved 
27 school of physical therapy. 
28 (13) For osteopathic physicians and surgeons, a committee 
29 of three members each of whom shall be a graduate of a 
30 chartered college of osteopathy of recognized standing. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
(14) For optometrists, a comrnitt:ee of three lice~sed 
optometrists. 
(15) For pharmaci5ts, a committee of five pharmacists to 
be designated as Utah state board of pharmacy. 
-10-
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2 ( 16) For veterinaries, a committee of three 
J ~eterinarians each of whom shall be a graduate of a college or 
4 university of standing recognized by the department of 
5 registration. 
6 
7 
(17) For plumbers, a committee of five persons. 
(18) For sanitarians, a committee of five persons, each 
8 of whom shall have had a minimum of five years' experience as a 
9 sanitarian. 
10 (19) For persons engaged in conducting, operating or 
11 maintaining in any home, residence or domiciliary facility the 
12 business of a nursing home, maternity home, the refuge care or 
13 maintenance of the needy, the care of the aged or infirm, for 
14 two or more nonrelated individuals, a committee of five 
15 certified operators, each of whom shall have had a minimum of 
16 five years' experience as a home operator. 
17 (20) For psychologists, a committee of five 
18 psychologists. 
19 ( 21) For landscape architects, a landscape architectural 
20 examining board of three (3) landscape architects, each of 
21 whom, after effective date of this act, shall be a licensed 
22 practitioner of landscape architecture in all branche? thereof 
23 in this state and a graduate of a recognized school of 
24 Landscape architecture. 
25 ( 22) For the practice of social work, a board of three 
26 certified social workers, one social service worker, 
27- 3oc1al service aide. 
and one 
28 ( 23) For marriage and family counselors, a commi~tee of 
29 five persons. 
JO ( 2-1-) For electricians, a board of five persons, to be 
31 known as the sta~e electrical board. 
32 ( 25) For electronic repair dealers, a committee of five 
33 persons. Three members of the committee shall be electronic 
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2 service dealers. The remaining members shall be chosen from 
3 t~e general public. 
4 (26) For recreational therapists, a committee of one 
5 therapeutic recreation specialist, one therapeutic recreation 
6 worker, one therapeutic recreation technician; and one member 
7 who shall be either an,instructor in therapeutic recreation at 
8 an accredited school providing a program in therapeutic 
9 recreation or a director of a clinical treatment center. 
10 (27) Fo~ t~e pr~ctice of speech pathology and audiology, 
11 a committee of five speech pathologists or audiologists, 
12 notwithstanding provisions of 58-1-6, all of whom shall be 
13 licensed, ex'cept for those initially appointed under this act, 
14 and shall be engaged in providing speech pathology or audiology 
15 services to the public as a major interest. One of the 
16 committee shall be in private practice as a primary 
17 professional interest and activity, one shall be from a non-
18 school clinic setting which provides ongoing speech pathology 
19 or audiology services, one shall be a provider of speech 
20 pathology or audiology services in the elementary or secondary 
21 schools, one shall be from a speech pathology and audiology 
22- college or university training program, and one shall be a 
23 prov:der of speech pathology or audiology services at large. 
24 At no time shall the board consist of more than three members 
25 who represent speech pathology or more than three members who 
26 represent audiology. 
27 (28) cor occupational therapists and occupational therapy 
28 assistants a board of five occupational therapists. 
29 (29) For hearing aid dealers, a committee of five persons 
JO consisting of a physician specializing in diseases of the ear, 
31 two licensed hearing 3id specialists who are certified members 
32 of the national hearing aid society or who are approved by the 
33 Utah hea:-ing aid society, two ·persons, eu:her utilizing a 
-12-
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2 hearinq aid o_;-,, a parent or guardian of a child utilizing a 
3 hearing aid. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
. (30) For the practice of massage, a board 
licensed massage technicians[**~**] and one lay membe~. 
Seation 24. Thia aa"t ahali exvire on July 11 1987, 
with the provisions of Chapter 55 1 of Title 63. 
in aooordance 
8 Section' [**24**] 25. This act shall take effect upon approval. 
9 
10 
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